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Abstract 
 Cognitive radio (CR) is introduced to accommodate the steady increment in the spectrum demand. Spectrum sensing is used to 
detect the unexploited sub-bands in the radio environment. In order to improve the accuracy of the spectrum sensing, the 
cooperative spectrum sensing method is assumed to be the best method to be used. However, misbehaving sensing nodes might 
falsify the spectrum sensing data to prevent legitimate nodes from utilizing the spectrum. Hence, wireless security has become an 
important issue in cognitive radio networks to ensure a reliable spectrum sensing and a fair resource allocation and management. 
A node misbehaves during the spectrum sensing phase by sending false sensing data to other cooperative sensing nodes. In this 
paper we propose a novel collaborative approach during spectrum sensing phase to monitor sensing nodes’ behavior and identify 
the misbehaving sensing nodes. The proposed approach measures the node’s reliability through a value called belief level (BL). 
The clustering method is used to divide all the sensing nodes in a specific number of clusters. Each cluster has a cluster head 
(CH) which is responsible for collecting sensing reports from different cognitive nodes in the same cluster about each other and 
identifying the misbehaving sensing nodes. Simulation results show the added value and the effectiveness of the proposed 
approach. 
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
Peer-review under responsibility of the Conference Program Chairs. 
Keywords:  Cognitive Radio; Belief Level; Misbehaving Node 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
In cognitive radio networks (CRN)1, unlicensed users, which are referred to as secondary users (SUs), are 
allowed to dynamically access the frequency bands when licensed users which are referred to as primary users (PUs) 
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are inactive. Because of the inefficient spectrum utilization of the licensed spectrum owners (PUs), and the increase 
in the spectrum demand, cognitive radio is proposed as a promising technology to improve spectrum utilization. 
Spectrum sensing is the first stage in cognitive radio in which SUs try to detect the presence or absence of PUs in 
their pre-reserved spectrum2. Failing in spectrum sensing results might cause substantial interference for those who 
use the spectrum. On the other hand, wrong results of the spectrum sensing lead to inefficient spectrum utilization. 
The probability of getting correct sensing results is low, if the spectrum sensing decision is made by each secondary 
user individually. If the cooperation concept is applied among the different secondary users, this probability will 
increase. So, cooperative spectrum sensing helps in achieving a higher accurate correct decision ratio. It alleviates 
the negative impacts on performance caused by multipath fading and shadowing2. It allows the secondary users to 
share their initial decisions about the vacant spectrum bands and then make their final decisions. Every participating 
user first detects the spectrum using any spectrum sensing method such as matched filter, energy detection, or 
cyclostationary feature detection3, and then they exchange their detection decisions. Detecting the spectrum holes in 
a fast method opens the doors for the researchers to develop new methods in spectrum sensing by taking different 
sensing situations when the conditions of the CR network are more dynamic. Collaboration concept is used to make 
the detection faster4. 
As any other type of wireless networks, cognitive radio networks (CRNs) are vulnerable to many security attacks. 
The radio technology itself is vulnerable to be attacked as any radio frequency can be blocked, or jammed, if a 
transmitter sends a signal at the same frequency, with enough power. There is no control over the behavior of these 
unlicensed users, which threatens the security of the licensed users. The most important behaviors of attackers can 
be categorized into the following: (i) misbehaving, (ii) selfish (iii) cheating or (iv) malicious5. The misbehaving 
attacker behavior is the severest category among the attacker behavior categories as if a node misbehaves; it can 
apply any of the other categories. A misbehaving node decreases the spectrum sensing performance by sending false 
sensing information to prevent other nodes from utilizing the spectrum. Therefore, any misbehaving node must be 
identified and mitigated during the spectrum sensing phase. 
    Due to the importance of the security issue in the context of CRN, it has recently received interest from 
researchers5,6,7. Researchers have focused more on studying the different attacks and finding methods to detect and 
mitigate one type of attack. None of them have studied the attacker behavior which leads to different attacks.        
New attacks have been introduced which are unique to CRN wherein malicious nodes utilize vulnerability of the 
reliability issues to attack a CRN. Any attack is a result of an attacker behavior. Primary User Emulation Attack 
(PUEA) in8,9 and Spectrum Sensing Data Falsification Attack (SSDF)10,11 are two examples of attacks which are 
unique to CRN that take place during the spectrum sensing phase. These two attacks are result of a misbehaving, 
cheating and malicious node. Researchers have mostly focused on mitigating the PUEA in CRN. In PUEA, an 
attacker may modify their air interface such that it emulates the primary-user’s signal characteristics12. In this attack, 
other secondary users will falsely determine that the frequency is in use by a legitimate primary user while in real it 
is not, and so vacate the frequency right away. In13 the authors introduce a robust technique based on the principal 
component analysis for spectrum sensing process to prevent any attack from targeting the network. A defense 
method against the primary user emulation attack is proposed in14. All secondary users in the network follow a 
sequence of steps until the suspect nodes are detected and excluded from the spectrum sensing process. In15, a fusion 
center receives the sensing information from the different SUs in the network which uses estimation algorithms to 
detect the primary user in the presence of the attacker. A multiple criteria scheme known as INCA for a 
decentralized and cooperative analysis of the PUEA presence in cognitive radio ad hoc networks is proposed in16. 
Each SU cooperates with its neighbors to detect the PUEA by broadcasting the probability of PU’s presence to its 
neighbors based on predetermined criteria such as received signal strength, transmission power, distance, noise, and 
transmission rate. This approach showed some improvements of the detection probability; however the maximum 
value that detection probability reaches is 0.5 which is not enough to rely on this approach. 
 In SSDF, the attackers share false sensing information into the decision stream as a legitimate member of the 
network. By doing that, the attackers aim to selfishly acquire increased spectrum availability for themselves, or the 
attackers may have a goal of disrupting the throughput of the network for other heinous reasons.     
The authors in17 propose a mitigation method for SSDF attack. During the sensing period, all the malicious nodes 
and the other SUs make their own decisions about the presence/absence of PUs in their bands and forward these 
decision to a fusion center. The fusion center keeps a track of how many times each node needs to have the right 
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decision about the PU; this number of times is called measure. The higher the value of the measure the less reliable 
the node’s observation is considered. The nodes with higher value of measure will be excluded from the following 
sensing results collection iteration. 
   In this paper, a collaborative approach for identifying and penalizing misbehaving node(s) during spectrum 
sensing phase is proposed. Each sensing node is assigned a value called belief level (BL) which describes the level 
of reliability of the sensing node to participate in the spectrum sensing phase. During the spectrum sensing phase, 
each sensing node forwards its sensing decision to its neighbors and to CH. The sensing nodes monitor the sensing 
behavior of each other and report other nodes’ sensing behavior to a central point called cluster head (CH) that takes 
the responsibility of penalizing the misbehaving node(s) and rewarding the normal behaving node(s). Permitting 
only normal behaving sensing nodes to participate in the spectrum sensing phase and to access the network helps to 
fairly allocate and manage the network resources, hence increases the spectrum utilization.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: The proposed approach is shown in Section 2. Section 3 presents 
scheme’s performance evaluation results that show the efficiency of the proposed model compared to other models. 
In Section 4 the system’s complexity and security are analyzed. We conclude this paper in Section 5. 
2. The proposed Approach 
The proposed approach is specific to CRN as a CR node can analyze and learn information from the communication 
environments with user’s preferences and demands, and reconfigure itself by adjusting system parameters 
conforming to certain policies and regulations. Moreover, a CR node could also negotiate with other network nodes 
to enable more efficient spectrum and network utilization. These properties are implicitly implemented in the 
proposed approach.  
2.1.  Preface  
Our system which is a network that has M secondary users (SUs) divided into K different clusters based on their 
geographical locations described in18. We assume that all SUs in the same cluster sense the same PU(s) channel(s). 
Fusion center (FC) controls the traffic over the network and manages the clusters. Each node is assigned an initial 
moderate BL value which is equal to two. We assume that the BL has a range of [0-4] where the nodes with high 
reliability have high BL and nodes with low reliability have lower BL. The belief level of each node is the key 
element of the proposed approach as it will be used to correctly monitor the sensing nodes’ behavior and detect the 
misbehaving nodes during the spectrum sensing phase. In each cluster, one node is chosen by FC as a cluster head 
(CH) which has the highest BL. However, at the time of cluster formation any node is randomly chosen as a CH as 
all the nodes have the same initial BL value. The energy detection method is used by all SUs to detect the presence or 
absence of the PU in its spectrum band wherein each node senses the spectrum band and receives a signal from the 
user over that channel, and then it compares it with pre-known information of PU’s signal. If the received signal 
matches the pre-known signal, the sensing node decides that that spectrum is used by a PU. To make the 
communication of the current nodes secure, we propose that the communication between the network nodes is done 
utilizing the public key cryptography and the symmetric key cryptography. Public key cryptography is used until a 
symmetric key is shared between the joining node, the FC, and the CH. The symmetric key will be assigned to each 
node during the node’s authentication process which is out of our interest in this paper. Detailed authentication 
process is described in19. Each node uses the same key for encoding and decoding the messages in the spectrum 
sensing phase. Symmetric key cryptography has many advantages that make it a good choice to use such as its 
straightforwardness, less memory occupation, less memory use, and less power utilization. When a node sends 
message to another node in the network, this message will be encrypted with the symmetric key. Meanwhile, the 
receiver decrypts this message by using the same key.  
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2.2.  Monitoring Sensing Nodes Behavior 
In this section, the behavior of the sensing nodes is monitored. Each sensing node measures the signal strengths in 
all PU’s channels, and by using the energy detection method SUs makes the initial decision (1: Channel is Free, 0: 
Channel is busy) about the presence/ absence of PU in its reserved channel(s). Each sensing node forwards its 
sensing decision(s) to its neighbors that check the correctness of these decisions.  
Each node will monitor the behavior of its neighboring nodes and keep sending periodic reports to its CH about their 
previous nodes behavior. If a node, ܵ ௜ܷ ,forwards its sensing decision to its neighboring node(s) and its sensing 
decision is same as its neighboring node(s) decision, ܵ ௜ܷ  will be considered as a “GOOD” behaving sensing node 
(normal behavior); otherwise it will be considered as a misbehaving “BAD” node. Reports sent by each cluster node 
to its CH have the following format (Reporting Node ||Reported Node ||Opinion) where Opinion is about the 
reported node and it is either 0 (i.e. “BAD” node) or 1 (i.e. “GOOD” node). Each sensing node keeps sending 
periodic reports every sensing round about its neighboring node(s) to CH which decides if these reports are true or 
false reports and based on that CH takes proper actions to the reported/reporting nodes. CH performs spectrum 
sensing by itself, therefore it knows if the sent reports are true or false reports. CH is the only node that can check 
the correctness of the periodic reports. Finding the misbehaving nodes in the cluster follows the voting approach, 
where the neighboring nodes of ܵ ௜ܷ send periodically their votes (reports) about the sensing behavior of ܵ ௜ܷ to the 
CH. A reporting (neighboring) cluster node votes “GOOD” about ܵ ௜ܷ  sensing behavior if ܵ ௜ܷ  sensing decision 
matches its own decision, otherwise it votes “BAD”. CH collects all the reports about ܵ ௜ܷ  sensing behavior and 
analyzes the reports to find a value called Adjustment Factor (AF). For each reported node, CH calculates (AF) as in 
(1) and then adds it to the latest value of BL as in (2). 
 
ܽݐݐ ൌ ݐ௨௣ௗ௔௧௘  
ܣܨௌ௎௜ ൌ ቀσ ןכ Գሺܤܮௌ௎௚ሻ௚ீୀଵǡஷ௜ ቁ െ ൫σ ߚ כ Գሺܤܮௌ௎௕ሻ஻௕ୀଵǡஷ௜ ൯              (1)            
ݏǤ ݐǤ െͶ ൑ ܣܨ ൑ Ͷ 
 
where G and B represent the number of nodes which decide that ܷܵ݅ is a good and bad node respectively. ןis the 
rewarding factor, and ߚ is the penalizing factor, Գሺܤܮௌ௎௕ሻis the normalized belief level of the node which reports 
that ܵ ௜ܷis a bad node, and Գሺܤܮௌ௎௚ሻis the normalized belief level of the node which reports that ܵ ௜ܷ is a good 
node. The rewarding factor and the penalizing factor are chosen as in real life where penalty has more weight than 
rewarding.   
The maximum and minimum values of AF is 4 and -4 respectively, i.e. if AF value is more than 4, it will be set to 4 
and if it is less than -4 it will be set to -4. The BL of each reporting cluster node is important in the process of 
finding the AF; the higher the BL of a reporting cluster node is, the higher the effect on the AF value is.  
Normal behaving sensing nodes will be rewarded for their normal behavior and that lets them gain higher belief 
level in the cluster. On the other hand, a misbehaving node is penalized for its misbehaving activity in the network 
and this decreases the desire of other cluster nodes to send data over this misbehaving node during data transmission 
phase.  
CH penalizes the misbehaving node by applying the proper penalty action according to the AF value.  
These penalty actions are: 
x P1: give a time out for three sensing rounds.  
x P2: de-allocate 50% of the assigned resources to the misbehaving node.  
x P3: de-allocate all resources and disconnect this node.  
x P4: mark the node as an undesirable node.  
 
Table 2 shows the proposed penalty scheme which depends on other cluster nodes decision about each other. 
Equation (2) finds the updated value of belief level of each cluster node at every reporting round, where 
൫ୗ୙౟൯௧ೠ೛೏ೌ೟೐షభis the belief level in the previous updating round. 
 
൫ܤܮௌ௎௜൯௧ೠ೛೏ೌ೟೐ ൌ ൫ܣܨௌ௎௜൯ ൅ ൫ܤܮௌ௎௜൯௧ೠ೛೏ೌ೟೐షభ                                (2) 
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 Table 1 Penalty Actions                                 Table 2 Simulation Parameters 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The detection probability ௗܲ of a misbehaving node in a cluster is the ratio of the nodes’ belief level that have 
voted “BAD” to the belief level of all the cluster nodes as shown in (3). 
 
ௗܲ ൌ σ Գ൫ܤܮௌ௎௕൯
஻௕ୀଵǡஷ௜
σ Գ൫ܤܮௌ௎௖൯஼௖ୀଵǡஷ௜
൘                   (3) 
Where Գ൫ܤܮௌ௎௖൯is the normalized value of the belief level of each reporting node in the same cluster about ܷܵ݅.  
CH analyzes the periodic reports to reward or penalize the reported node and the reporting node. There are three 
different possibilities for the sent periodic reports as following: 
 
x CH rewards the reporting and reported nodes if CH receives a true “GOOD” report from the reporting 
node. 
x CH penalizes the reporting node and does nothing to the reported node if CH receives a false “GOOD” 
or a false “BAD” report from the reporting node. 
x CH rewards the reporting node and penalizes the reported node if CH receives a true “BAD” report from 
the reporting node. 
3. Performance Evaluation 
We simulate our approach for identifying the misbehaving sensing nodes using Table 2. The normal behavior of any 
cluster node is illustrated in Fig. 1 such that each node starts with a moderate belief level and keeps gaining more 
belief through the spectrum sensing phase until it reaches the maximum belief level of four. On the other hand, the 
misbehaving node initially has a moderate level of belief level; however its belief level keeps decreasing with the 
time due to its abnormal behavior in the cluster till it reaches the minimum value of zero.  
The relation between the transmission rate of cluster nodes and their belief level is shown in Fig. 2. We compare our 
model with and without applying the BL concept. We assume all nodes initially achieve 70 percent of its desired 
transmission rate.  If a node acts normally, its transmission rate will keep increasing due to the increment in its belief 
level. If a node is acting in a semi-misbehaving way (i.e. |AF| is less than 3), then its transmission rate decreases 
with the time but not as if it is a completely misbehaving node (i.e. |AF| is greater than 3) wherein its transmission 
rate takes less time to reach zero. A comparison between the centralized model with no clusters and the proposed 
scheme in terms of computation cost (CPU, Memory, and so on) is illustrated in Fig. 3. It is depicted that as the 
number of SUs and CHs increments, less computation is done at the CH in our proposed model compared to the 
centralized model. 
Our model reduces the computation management at the CH with up to 56%. Fig. 4 compares the detection 
probability between our proposed model and INCA shown in16. Detection probability increases when number of  
Adjustment Factor (AF) Penalty Action(s) 
െͳ ൏ 	 ൑ Ͳ No extra penalty 
െʹ ൏ 	 ൑ െͳ P1 
െ͵ ൏ 	 ൑ െʹ P1 and  P2 
െͶ ൏ 	 ൑ െ͵ P3 
െͶ P3 and P4 
Parameter Value 
Number of SUs (M) [0-125] 
Number of Clusters (K) [0-15] 
Number of Frauds (F) 5% of  SUs 
ߙ 0.3 
ߚ 0.7 
FC transmission range (ܴி஼) 1000 m 
SUs transmission range 
(ܴௌ௎௜ሻ 
250 m 
PUs transmission range 500 m 
୲୦୰ୣୱ୦୭୪ୢ 2 
େୌ [2-4] 
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        Fig.1 Belief Level over Time                                         Fig.2. Transmission Rate over Time                                 
 
      Fig.3. Computation Cost vs. Number of SUs                          Fig.4.  Detection Probability (Our Model vs.  INCA)   
 
cooperating nodes increments. In INCA the detection probability reaches a maximum value of 0.5 while in our 
proposed technique it keeps increasing until it reaches the maximum value of one when all the cooperating nodes 
(i.e. B=8 nodes) decide that their previous node is a misbehaving node.                           
4.                 Complexity and Security Analysis 
In the centralized model with no clusters, a bidirectional way of messages between all SUs and the FC is used, 
therefore 2 * M is the total number of messages that FC needs to manipulate. In our proposed model using clusters, 
the number of message exchanged is less and the total number of messages that FC is dealing with is 2 * K, where K 
is the number of cluster heads. 
2 * K is much less than 2 * M, reducing the computation complexity at the FC. 
In the centralized model, the amount of computation at FC is equal to ቀܯʹቁin order to find the misbehaving node(s). 
In our model, FC has less computation amount equals to ቀܭ כ ܨʹ ቁwhich increases the network efficiency where F is 
number of frauds in the system. 
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The proposed model prevents any node from acting in a misbehaving way. Different attacks that might occur 
because of the abnormal behavior of network nodes (misbehaving nodes) are eliminated by our proposed 
collaborative approach. We show here some attacks that can be detected and mitigated by our collaborative 
approach. In this section, we analyze the attacks behavior and we show how our approach can help in identifying the 
malicious nodes which launch these attacks. Our focus is more on identifying the malicious nodes behavior more 
than simulating and detecting the attacks themselves. 
x PUE Attack: the nodes collaboration by sending reports about their neighboring nodes makes each node known 
to other cluster nodes, therefore even if one cluster node tries to emulate a PU, it will be detected and punished 
as its cluster head has its information. Moreover, as all messages transferred between the cluster nodes and the 
CH are encrypted by cryptographic key approach, no SU can send signals which are similar to PUs signals. 
Each PU has to add its signature to each message that it sends over its channels, and if one SU tries to emulate 
PU, it cannot add a signature that is similar to PU’s signature and will be easily detected. 
x SSDF Attack: in this attack, the attacker might send false sensing results to its neighbors stating that the PU is 
present in its band while in real it is not in order to gain exclusive access to the spectrum and to prevent other 
nodes from utilizing the spectrum. Our approach detects this kind of attacker behavior by applying the 
cooperation between all the cluster nodes wherein each node votes if it is neighboring node is a misbehaving 
node or not. Moreover, the CH as a trustworthy node can decide if any node is sending false sensing results or 
false reports about other nodes. Another form of this attack is that the attacker states that the PU is absent in its 
band while in real it is not. The attacker in this case aims to cause interference with the PU and therefore 
degrades the PU’s QoS. By applying our proposed approach, the final spectrum sensing decision about the 
spectrum is made by the CH after collecting and analyzing the reports of all its cluster nodes. All nodes will rely 
on CH’s final decision about the spectrum bands. 
x DoS Attack: it might be launched at CH as a joining node might show a good behavior at the joining time to 
become a CH, and then it acts abnormally and lies about the honesty of other nodes, giving them low belief 
values and reducing the network throughput. Such a behavior is prevented as the clusters are being dynamically 
reformed whenever a new node is admitted to the network or when one node has a higher BL than the CH’s BL; 
therefore the cluster heads are not fixed all the time.  
x Objective Function Attack: the attacker tries to change the radio parameters (such as center frequency, 
bandwidth, encryption type, and frame size) to reduce the network objective which is always to have higher 
security and higher transmission rate. But by applying our proposed approach, a node will get less chance to 
change any of these parameters due to CH’s control over the network nodes by using the BL management 
scheme. Moreover, penalty mechanism reduces the resources assigned to the misbehaving node which reduces 
the opportunity for the misbehaving node to change the radio parameters. 
x Collusion Attack: as the collusive reporting node sends false reports about its previous node(s), CH uses the 
reports sent by its other node(s) to determine the correctness of its reports. Incorrect reports are determined 
upon the comparison of the reports sent by the reporting node, other nodes’ reports and CH’s sensing decision 
itself. Such a comparison leads to identify the compromised and collusive nodes in the network. No node will 
like to have its belief level decremented, or be considered as a compromised or collusive node. By the role of 
CH and applying the penalty scheme, a node will send true reports about other sensing node(s) and will not 
send false reports to protect itself from being penalized or considered as a collusive or compromised node.  
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we propose a collaborative approach in CRN to detect and mitigate misbehaving nodes during the 
spectrum sensing phases. In the proposed approach, all sensing nodes collaborate with each other to identify the 
misbehaving nodes by using the nodes’ belief level. First, each node performs the spectrum sensing and forwards its 
sensing results to its neighbors and CH. Next, each node compares its own sensing results with the received sensing 
results and if they match it reports to CH that its neighboring node is a good node i.e. it sent a true sensing result. 
And finally CH checks the periodic reports sent by each sensing node to identify the misbehaving nodes which are 
the nodes that have sent false sensing results to its neighboring nodes. The simulation results and the security 
analysis showed the performance of our proposed approach and proved that it can mitigate different kind of attacks. 
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